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Pegram v. Herdrich: A Victory for HMOs or The Beginning
of the End for ERISA Preemption?
Phyllis C. Borzi, J.D., M.A.*
On June 12, 2000, a unanimous Supreme Court held that treatment
decisions made by an HMO, acting through its physicians, are not fiduciary
acts under ERISA.1 Thus the Carle HMO was not liable under ERISA for
the harm caused when Pegram, one of Carle's physician/owners, required
Herdrich to wait an additional eight days before undergoing a necessary
diagnostic procedure and, when Herdrich's appendix ruptured during her
wait for the procedure, then required her to receive emergency treatment
at a Carle-owned facility fifty miles away, rather than at a nearby hospital.
At first blush, this seemed like yet another judicial decision insulating
managed care organizations (MCOs) from liability under ERISA.
Advocates of expanding patients' rights to sue health plans under
legislation before Congress2 might have been expected to bombard
members of Congress with outraged communications decrying Pegram as
another illustration of how inadequate ERISA was in protecting
participants in employer-sponsored group health plans. But the early
euphoria or dismay quickly dissipated as ERISA experts began to focus on
the larger legal questions raised by Justice Souter's opinion. In particular,
much discussion has ensued regarding the implications of the Pegram
decision for preemption cases under which plaintiffs have been permitted
to bring state law actions alleging substandard quality of care from their
health plans.
Pegram is a complex, yet fascinating, case that reveals the Supreme
Court poised on the brink of another major erosion of ERISA preemption,
* Phyllis C. Borzi is Of Counsel at O'Donoghue & O'Donoghue, a Washington, D.C. law
firm, where she specializes in ERISA and other issues relating to employer-sponsored
benefit programs. She is also a Research Professor at the Center for Health Services
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University Medical Center, and the co-director of the Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program
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even though the case itself did not involve ERISA preemption at all, but
rather the scope of ERISA's fiduciary provisions. Under ERISA, state laws
that relate to ERISA-covered employee benefit plans are generally
preempted. However, certain state laws relating to ERISA group health
plans may be saved from preemption if they are laws regulating insurance
that do not treat plans as insurance companies.'
At its core, Pegram asks a question of intense interest to patients in
managed care plans everywhere: Does the common HMO practice of
providing financial rewards for doctors who reduce utilization of medical
services violate ERISA's fiduciary rules? In other words, is the use of
financial incentives for HMO doctors to ration care per se illegal under
ERISA? A unanimous Supreme Court said no, because decisions that
intertwine questions of eligibility for coverage and treatment judgments
("mixed eligibility decisions") are not fiduciary acts under ERISA.4
Most commentators believed that the Court would find that decisions
regarding how to structure the MCO delivering medical care to
participants under an ERISA-covered plan were not fiduciary decisions. So
the Court's ultimate conclusion was hardly a bombshell. However, how the
Court reached that result, as well as some of the observations the Court
made, and conclusions it drew in arriving at its result, were both surprising
and revealing.
Pegram involved a medical malpractice action brought in state court
against both the treating physician and Carle. After the malpractice case
was brought, Herdrich added two counts of state law fraud. Arguing that
the fraud claims were preempted by ERISA, the defendants removed the
case to federal court and sought summary judgment on the fraud counts.
5
The district court granted the defendant's motion on one count, but
permitted the plaintiff to amend her complaint to allege that the HMO's
practice of rewarding physicians (who also owned the health plan) violated
ERISA's fiduciary standards. Herdrich alleged, among other things, that
the HMO had breached its fiduciary duty under ERISA because the
financial incentives for plan providers were structured to encourage
reductions in treatment as a way to increase the bonus pool available at the
end of the year. The district court granted the defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the amended fraud claim.
Herdrich appealed, and the Seventh Circuit, reversing the district
court, held that the HMO was acting as a fiduciary when its physicians
made their treatment decisions.6 The decisions made by Carle physicians,
including the operation of the doctor-referral process, the nature and
duration of patient treatment, and the extent to which participants were
required to use Carle-owned facilities were all held to be fiduciary acts.
I1(2001)
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Thus the circuit court allowed the plaintiff to proceed to trial on the
breach of fiduciary duty allegations.
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Supreme Court, reversed the
Seventh Circuit and held that treatment decisions made by an HMO,
acting through its physicians, are not fiduciary acts.' To reach that
conclusion, Justice Souter first explained how HMOs operate, describing
the various mechanisms used by HMOs to control costs as comparable to
"other risk-bearing organizations" and "traditional insurers."' Justice
Souter observed that HMOs customarily issue general guidelines to
physicians concerning the appropriate levels of care, complemented by a
system of financial incentives designed to encourage doctors to provide
less care. The countervailing force against these financial incentives to
ration care is "the professional obligation to provide covered services with
a reasonable degree of skill and judgment in the patient's interest.""
However, "no HMO organization could survive without some incentive
connecting physician reward with treatment rationing," Justice Souter
concluded.' Although Herdrich's claim focused on Carle's for-profit
character, ultimately the Court found that to be irrelevant.
The Court next looked at the requirements of ERISA. Carle was
charged with a breach of fiduciary duty in connection with carrying out its
obligations under the State Farm medical plan. For the first time, the
Court tackled two critical questions that lower courts often ignore: What is
a "plan" under ERISA, and is the HMO itself an ERISA plan? Relying on
the plain dictionary meaning of "plan" (i.e., a scheme decided on in
advance), the Court concluded that a plan is "a set of rules that define the
rights of a beneficiary and provide for their enforcement."" Thus:
.. when employers contract with an HMO to provide benefits to
employees subject to ERISA, the provisions of documents that set up the
HMO are not, as such, an ERISA plan, but the agreement between the
HMO and an employer who pays the premiums may, as here, provide
elements of a plan by setting out rules under which beneficiaries will be
entitled to care.12
Fiduciaries exercise discretion or control over the plan investments
and plan administration.'3 But when HMOs contract with an ERISA plan,
not every act an HMO performs is a fiduciary act. The Court distinguished
between the HMO's exercise of discretion over its own business (not a
fiduciary act) and its exercise of discretion over the ERISA plan (a
fiduciary act). 4 In addition, the Court noted that at common law, trustees
3
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only wore their fiduciary hats, whereas under ERISA they can wear several
hats, although only one at a time. Justice Souter used the example of an
employer who, when acting as an employer or as a settlor of a plan, can
take actions that disadvantage participants (e.g., amending the plan to
provide less generous future benefits), yet when the employer is acting as a
fiduciary, the duty of loyalty and the exclusive benefit rule preclude such
actions."
Herdrich argued that Carle and its physicians/agents breached their
fiduciary duty under ERISA to act solely in the interest of participants and
beneficiaries because their medical treatment decisions were influenced by
financial incentives to maximize profits. However, the Court rejected that
argument for two reasons: (1) since a plan sponsor's decision about the
content of the ERISA plan is a settlor, not a fiduciary, decision, the HMO's
comparable decision to include financial incentives in its organizational
structure cannot be a fiduciary act either, and (2) since the financial
incentive structure adopted by Carle preceded its contract to deliver
benefits to State Farm's employees under the company's ERISA plan, acts
prior to the establishment of the plan could hardly be fiduciary acts with
respect to that plan." When Carle became a fiduciary as a result of its plan
administration activities, however, the question arose whether the HMO's
treatment decisions (which were alleged to be compromised by the
existence of the financial incentives) were fiduciary decisions.
In making that determination, the Court first distinguished between
"pure eligibility decisions" and "treatment decisions.""' The former depend
on whether or not the plan covers a particular treatment or provider, while
the latter are "choices about how to go about diagnosing and treating a
patient's condition: given a patient's constellation of symptoms, what is the
appropriate medical response?""' Because treatment and eligibility are
often inextricably bound, "mixed eligibility decisions" (i.e., those involving
medical judgment by a physician) are not fiduciary decisions under the
Court's analysis, but rather must be measured against state malpractice
standards. °
In considering why a plaintiff might be interested in pursuing a breach
of fiduciary duty case under ERISA in the first place, the Court posits that
in states that do not allow malpractice actions against HMOs, the plaintiff
may believe that he or she will be able to go after a deeper pocket than the
treating physician if federal fiduciary duty claims could be brought against
the HMO. But the Court gives short shrift to its own speculation. What is
significant about this speculation is that the Court appears to assume that
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Interestingly, the Court also makes several important points in
footnotes to the opinion. Although dicta, these comments both illustrate
and illuminate the next set of battles likely to come under Court scrutiny.
First, the Court raises the intriguing possibility that even though Carle's
decision to include financial incentives for its doctors does not violate
ERISA's fiduciary rules, Carle may be required to disclose the existence of
these financial incentives, even if they are not illegal. This is because
Carle's discretion with respect to plan administration makes it a fiduciary
to an ERISA plan.22 Second, the Court indicates that because this case
involves a breach of fiduciary duty claim under ERISA § 502(a)(3)23 and
not a claim for benefits under ERISA § 502(b)(1)(A),24 the Court does not
need to address the question of whether, if the same set of facts came
before the Court styled as a benefit claim case,2 ' various state causes of
action would be preempted. This latter statement is the source of some of
the most intense speculation regarding the ultimate direction in which the
Court is heading.
Pegram tells us that challenges under ERISA regarding the nature of
managed care itself (i.e., the structure of an MCO delivering care to
participants in an ERISA-covered plan) will not be successful. However,
other aspects of how the MCO actually provides that care (the "when-and-
how question 2 6 ) as it administers an ERISA plan are fair game-but
probably under state law, not ERISA.
In reiterating its primary holding that mixed eligibility decisions (i.e,
those that involve medical judgment) are not fiduciary acts, the Court is
breaking new ground with profound implications for ERISA's current
preemption jurisprudence. Until this point, courts have generally rejected
state law challenges to so-called "coverage" decisions, even those involving
medical judgment.2 7 With the exception of the Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc.
line of cases described below, 28 lower courts have routinely found
preempted state law causes of action in cases involving challenges to
decisions that defendants have successfully argued concern coverage
questions-whether or not the treatment or services sought are covered by
the plan. As the Court acknowledges in Pegram, these questions are rarely
simple. Rather, they often concern questions of medical judgment such as
whether a particular treatment is "medically necessary. ' '2 ' But is that
determination a coverage decision or a medical one? Prior to Pegram, if a
court found that an aspect of the decision was a coverage question, even if
medical judgment was also involved, state law was preempted.
After Pegram, the Court appears to be on the brink of an even more
fundamental restriction on the sweep of ERISA preemption than the Third
Circuit's approach in Dukes." Dukes is the seminal case in which courts
5
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imposed vicarious liability on HMOs for the negligence of their doctors. In
Dukes, the circuit court distinguished between allegations concerning
coverage and those concerning the quality of care the participant received.
Because the Dukes court agreed that the dispute was not centered on the
plaintiff's failure to receive the services promised under the ERISA plan,
but rather the allegations that the care the plaintiff received was
substandard, the Third Circuit held that the state law negligence case was
not preempted by ERISA. The court noted that had the case only involved
coverage questions, state law would have been preempted.
Dukes is significant, not only for the standards the court sets, but also
because it marked the first time that the U.S. Department of Labor, as
amicus curiae, weighed in to support the argument that state law medical
malpractice claims were not preempted. The courts that have refused to
follow Dukes"' have done so in part because they believe that the distinction
between coverage and quality is an artificial one designed simply to
provide more generous relief under state law in cases that would otherwise
be limited by ERISA's narrow remedies.
But applying Pegram's analysis to allegations of medical malpractice in
preemption cases may be even more helpful to plaintiffs. The claims at
issue in Dukes, in the view of the Supreme Court in Pegram, were either
simple treatment decisions, or at worst, mixed eligibility decisions. Even
under the Dukes rationale, however, if the decision implicated coverage
issues, the Third Circuit would have found state law preempted, even if the
decision was a "mixed eligibility decision." However, applying the Pegram
rationale, the Court would presumably decide differently and uphold the
application of state law because a decision requiring the exercise of
medical judgment (such as whether or not an otherwise non-excluded
service or treatment was medically necessary) is a "mixed eligibility
decision."
Thus the Court in Pegram appears to be ready to push even more types
of decisions out of the ERISA ambit and into state courts by holding that
HMO decisions requiring physician judgment, even those also involving
coverage issues, are not covered by ERISA. Although consistent with the
overall direction of this Supreme Court in upholding state prerogatives
over federal regulation, Pegram holds the potential for further eroding
ERISA preemption. This is good news for participants who are injured by
delay or denial of treatment by HMOs and who are attempting to hold
HMOs more accountable for their allegedly negligent decisions in
connection with ERISA-covered group health plans.
I1(2001)
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1. Pegram, 530 U.S. 211 (2000).
2. E.g., H.R. 2990, 106th Cong. § 1302
(1999); H.R. 2723, 106th Cong. (1999). On
October 6, 1999, the U.S. House of
Representatives passed H.R. 2990, which
incorporated both the provisions of the
original H.R. 2990, the Quality Care for the
Uninsured Act of 1999, and H.R. 2723, the
Bipartisan Consensus Managed Care
Improvement Act of 1999. The bill passed
by the House amended Title I of ERISA to
expand the current right to sue and the
remedies available for participants in
ERISA-covered plans (both fully insured
and self-insured). It permitted injured
participants to recover damages under state
personal injury or wrongful death laws in
certain circumstances after all applicable
administrative appeals, both internal and
external, had been exhausted. Punitive
damages would be available under state law
only if the group health plan or health
insurance issuer had not complied with the
decision of the external reviewer. The
Senate passed a much more limited version
of the bill. When the 106th Congress
adjourned, no final action was taken on the
bills, although they were the subject of
heated debate and discussion.
3. ERISA § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(1994).
4. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 230.
5. Herdrich prevailed on her original
state malpractice claims, and the jury
awarded her $35,000. See Herdrich v.
Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 367 (7th Cir. 1998)
for history of the case.
6. Id. at 370 ("We can reasonably infer
that Carle and HAMP were plan fiduciaries
due to their discretionary authority in
deciding disputed claims."). Id.
7. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 231.
8. Id. at 219.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 220.
11. Id. at 223.
12. Id.
13. The test of whether a person is a
fiduciary under ERISA is a functional one.
Under ERISA § 3(21), a person is a
fiduciary "to the extent" that the person:
(1) exercises any discretionary authority or
control over the management of the plan
or the management or disposition of its
assets, (2) renders investment advice
regarding plan assets for a fee or other
direct or indirect compensation, or has the
authority or responsibility to do so, or (3)
has any discretionary authority or control
over plan administration. 29 U.S.C. §
1002(21) (1994).
14. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 223.
15. Id. at 225.
16. Id. at 225-26.
17. Id. at 227.
18. Id. at 228.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 237.
21. Id.
22. The Court notes that although the
fraud claims in the original complaint filed
by Herdrich in state court could be
described as claims alleging that failure by
Carle to disclose the existence of its
financial incentives was itself a fiduciary
breach, the amended complaint before the
Court does not raise that point and
therefore the issue is not properly before
the Court. Id. at 228 n.8.
23. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1998).
24. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (1998).
Individuals who are challenging improper
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benefit denials can file suit under ERISA §
502(a) (1) (B). Herdrich could have
brought a benefit claim action challenging
the HMO's decision to make her wait eight
days to have the sonogram or the decision
requiring her to bypass her local hospital
and seek emergency treatment at a distant
Carle-owned facility as violating her rights
as a beneficiary tinder the terms of the
ERISA plan. This action could have been
brought in either state or federal court.
Instead of suing under ERISA, where
remedies for successful plaintiffs in benefit
claims actions are limited to the provision
of the denied benefit, plaintiffs typically
allege various state law negligence claims,
such as the medical malpractice counts
raised by Herdrich in her original suit.
Then the issue before the courts would
have been whether those state law claims
were preempted by ERISA § 514. Under
ERISA § 514, state laws that "relate to"
ERISA plans and are not otherwise saved by
ERISA's insurance savings clause are
preempted. 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1998).
25. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 229 n.9.
26. Id. at 228-29.
27. E.g., Corcoran v. United
HealthCare, Inc., 965 F.2d 1321 (5th Cir.
1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1033 (1992). In
Corcoran, the treating obstetrician sought
precertification for a hospital stay during
the plaintiffs high-risk pregnancy. In
performing utilization review for the
employer's self-funded medical plan, the
defendant determined that hospitalization
was not necessary and instead authorized
ten hours per day of home nursing care.
During a period when no nurse was on
duty, the fetus went into distress and died.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district
court's decision that ERISA preempted the
plaintiffs' state law tort claim for the
wrongful death of their child allegedly
resulting from defendant's erroneous
medical decision. Although the defendant
made medical decisions and gave medical
advice, the court determined that it did so
in the context of determining the
availability of benefits tinder an ERISA plan
and therefore its decision to deny
hospitalization was a coverage decision.
Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs'
malpractice claims related to the plan and
were preempted by ERISA.
28. Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 57
F.3d 350 (3d Cir. 1995); cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1009 (1995). These cases distinguish
between claims that the plaintiff allegedly
failed to receive covered services under the
plan and claims in which the plaintiff
alleges that the services provided under the
plan were substandard ("quality of care"
cases). In the former cases, state law is
preempted by ERISA. In the latter cases,
however, courts have permitted the
plaintiff to pursue state law tort challenges
to the quality of care received.
29. Plans and insurance contracts
routinely cover only specified services when
medically necessary. That necessitates an
individualized decision at the point at
which treatment is requested-with respect
to a particular patient, an otherwise
covered service (i.e., a service that is not
excluded under the terms of a plan) ought
to be provided because it is medically
necessary to treat this patient, given his or
her symptoms or condition.
30. Dukes, 57 F.3d 350, cert. denied, 516
U.S. 1009. Two other circuits have followed
this approach; one has explicitly rejected it.
1 (20o01)
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Compare Rice v. Panchal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th
Cir. 1995), amended, reh'g denied en banc, sub
nom Rice v. Kann, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS
31419 (7th Cir. 1995), and Pacificare of Ok.
v. Burrage, 59 F.3d 151 (10th Cir. 1995),
with Hull v. Fallon, 188 F.3d 939 (8th Cir.
1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1189 (2000). In
addition, the Third Circuit recently
expanded upon the Dukes principles in In
re U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 193 F.3d 151 (3d Cir.
1999) (this case is sometimes referred to as
Bauman v. U.S. Healthcare).
31. E.g., Hull, 188 F.3d 939, cert. denied,
528 U.S. 1189 (2000).
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